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h i g h l i g h t s
• The solution concept of generalized Nash equilibrium for static games with incomplete information is illustrated with an intuitive example
embedded in a story.
• An existence construction for generalized Nash equilibrium is provided (Theorem 1). This result can be viewed as an incomplete information
generalization of the classical (Nash, 1950) result.
• An epistemic characterization of generalized Nash equilibrium is given (Theorem 2) in a way that common belief in rationality is neither assumed
nor implied (Remark 1).
• As a side result an epistemic characterization of Nash equilibrium for static games with complete information ensues (Corollary 1).
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a b s t r a c t
We provide an existence result for the solution concept of generalized Nash equilibrium, which can
be viewed as the direct incomplete information analogue of Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, a tuple
consisting of a probability measure for every player on his choices and utility functions is a generalized
Nash equilibrium, whenever some mutual optimality property is satisfied. This incomplete information
solution concept is then epistemically characterized in a way that common belief in rationality is
neither used nor implied. For the special case of complete information, an epistemic characterization
of Nash equilibrium ensues as a corollary.
© 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction1
In game theory Nash’s (1950) and (1951) notion of equilib-2
rium constitutes one of the most prevalent solution concepts for3
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static games with complete information. Existence of this solution 4
concept has been established by Nash (1950) based on Kaku- 5
tani’s generalized fixed point theorem (Kakutani, 1941, Theorem 6
1) for the class of finite static games with complete informa- 7
tion. Besides, Nash (1951) gives a different proof of existence by 8
only relying on Brouwer’s original fixed point theorem (Brouwer, 9
1911, Satz 4). 10
In order to unveil the reasoning assumptions underlying Nash 11
equilibrium, epistemic foundations have been provided for this 12
classical solution concept by, for instance, Aumann and Bran- 13
denburger (1995), Perea (2007), Barelli (2009), as well as Bach 14
and Tsakas (2014). In each of these epistemic foundations some 15
correct beliefs assumption is needed to obtain Nash equilibrium. 16
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108526
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Fig. 1. Utility functions of Alice and Bob.
Fig. 2. Interactive representation of the two-player game with incomplete
information and utility functions as specified in Fig. 1.
As correct beliefs seems to be a rather demanding requirement,1
Nash equilibrium does actually impose non-trivial conditions on2
the players’ reasoning.3
In static games with incomplete information, players face un-4
certainty about the opponents’ utility functions. For this more5
general class of games the most widespread solution concept is6
Harsanyi’s (1967-68) Bayesian equilibrium. In fact, Bayesian equi-7
librium does not generalize Nash equilibrium but correlated equi-8
librium to incomplete information (cf. Battigalli and Siniscalchi,9
2003; Bach and Perea, 2017).10
However, a direct incomplete information analogue to Nash11
equilibrium can be defined, by extending its mutual optimality12
property to payoff uncertainty. Accordingly, a tuple consisting of13
beliefs about each player’s choice and utility function is called a14
generalized Nash equilibrium, whenever each belief only assigns15
positive probability to choice utility function pairs such that the16
choice is optimal for the utility function and the product measure17
of the beliefs on the opponents’ choices. Coinciding with the18
mutual optimality property definition of Nash equilibrium in the19
case of complete information with mixed strategies interpreted20
as beliefs, the notion of generalized Nash equilibrium thus pro-21
vides a direct generalization of Nash equilibrium to incomplete22
information.23
As an illustration of the incomplete information solution con-24
cept of generalized Nash equilibrium, suppose a game between25
two players Alice and Bob who are both invited to a party. They26
need to – simultaneously and independently – choose the colour27
of their outfits to be black or pink, or alternatively, to stay at28
home. Alice prefers wearing the same colour as Bob to staying at29
home, but prefers staying at home to attending the party with a30
different colour than Bob. Alice is not sure about Bob’s preferences.31
She thinks that he either entertains the same preferences as she32
or that he prefers attending the party with a different colour33
than she to staying at home, but prefers staying at home to34
attending the party with the same colour as she. The utility func-35
tions for Alice and Bob are provided in Fig. 1, and an interactive36
representation of the game is given in Fig. 2.37
Consider the two beliefs (black, uA) about Alice’s choice and38
utility function as well as 34 · (black, uB) + 14 · (pink, u′B) about39
Bob’s choice and utility function. Note that black is optimal for40
Alice’s utility function uA, if she believes Bob to wear black with41
probability 34 and pink with probability
1
4 . Also, black is optimal42
for Bob’s utility function uB, if he believes Alice to wear black, and43
pink is optimal for Bob’s utility function u′B, if he believes her to44
wear black. The two beliefs (black, uA) and
( 3
4 · (black, uB) + 14 ·45
(pink, u′B)
)
thus form a generalized Nash equilibrium.46
This note first establishes the existence of generalized Nash47
equilibrium for the class of static games with incomplete in-48
formation. Then, an epistemic characterization of this solution49
concept is provided. The epistemic conditions are intended to be 50
as minimal as possible. In particular, it is shown that they actually 51
do not imply common belief in rationality. Similarly to the special 52
case of complete information with Nash equilibrium, a correct 53
beliefs assumption also emerges as the decisive property for play- 54
ers to reason in line with generalized Nash equilibrium. Besides, 55
for complete information games an epistemic characterization of 56
Nash equilibrium ensues as a corollary. 57
2. Generalized Nash equilibrium 58
A game with incomplete information is modelled as a tuple 59
Γ = (I, (Ci)i∈I , (Ui)i∈I), where I is a finite set of players, Ci denotes 60
player i’s finite choice set, and the finite set Ui contains player 61
i’s utility functions, where a utility function ui : ×j∈ICj → R 62
from Ui assigns a real number ui(c) to every choice combination 63
c ∈ ×j∈ICj. Complete information obtains as a special case, if the 64
set Ui is a singleton for every player i ∈ I . 65
Before the solution concept of generalized Nash equilibrium 66
for games with incomplete information is defined, attention is 67
restricted to complete information and the classical solution con- 68
cept of Nash equilibrium is recalled. For a given game Γ = 69(
I, (Ci)i∈I , ({ui})i∈I
)
with complete information, a tuple (σi)i∈I ∈ 70
×i∈I∆(Ci) of probability measures constitutes a Nash equilibrium, 71
whenever for all i ∈ I and for all ci ∈ Ci, if σi(ci) > 0, 72
then
∑
c−i∈C−i σ−i(c−i) · ui(ci, c−i) ≥
∑
c−i∈C−i σ−i(c−i) · ui(c ′i , c−i) 73
for all c ′i ∈ Ci.1 A direct generalization of Nash equilibrium to 74
incomplete information obtains as follows. 75
Definition 1. Let Γ be a game with incomplete information, and
(βi)i∈I ∈ ×i∈I
(
∆(Ci × Ui)
)
be a tuple of probability measures. The
tuple (βi)i∈I constitutes a generalized Nash equilibrium, whenever
for all i ∈ I and for all (ci, ui) ∈ Ci × Ui, if βi(ci, ui) > 0, then∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i) · ui(ci, c−i)
≥
∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i) · ui(c ′i , c−i)
for all c ′i ∈ Ci. 76
Intuitively, the mutual optimality property of the players’ sup- 77
ports required by the complete information solution concept of 78
Nash equilibrium is extended to the augmented uncertainty space 79
of choices and utility functions. In the specific case of complete 80
information, i.e. Ui = {ui} for all i ∈ I , the notion of generalized 81
Nash equilibrium formally indeed reduces to Nash equilibrium. In 82
other words, generalized Nash equilibrium imposes the analogous 83
condition on the – due to payoff uncertainty extended – space 84
×i∈I
(
∆(Ci × Ui)
)
that Nash equilibrium imposes on the space 85
×i∈I∆(Ci). Note that for the game represented in Fig. 2, the tuple 86(
(black, uA), 34 · (black, uB) + 14 · (pink, u′B)
)
indeed constitutes a 87
generalized Nash equilibrium. 88
In order to characterize decision-making in line with gen- 89
eralized Nash equilibrium, the notion of optimal choice in a 90
generalized Nash equilibrium is defined next. 91
1 Given collection {Xi : i ∈ I} of sets and probability measures pi ∈ ∆(Xi)
for all i ∈ I , the set X−i refers to the product set ×j∈I\{i}Xj and the probability
measure p−i refers to the product measure Πj∈I\{i}pj ∈ ∆(X−i) on X−i .
ECOLET: 108526
Please cite this article as: C.W. Bach and A. Perea, Generalized Nash equilibrium without common belief in rationality. Economics Letters (2019) 108526,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108526.
C.W. Bach and A. Perea / Economics Letters xxx (xxxx) xxx 3
Definition 2. Let Γ be a game with incomplete information,
i ∈ I a player, and ui ∈ Ui some utility function of player i. A
choice ci ∈ Ci of player i is optimal for the utility function ui in
a generalized Nash equilibrium, if there exists a generalized Nash
equilibrium (βi)i∈I ∈ ×i∈I
(
∆(Ci × Ui)
)
such that∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i) · ui(ci, c−i)
≥
∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i) · ui(c ′i , c−i)
for all c ′i ∈ Ci.1
In fact, it can be shown that in terms of optimal choices gen-2
eralized Nash equilibrium refines Harsanyi’s (1967-68) solution3
concept of Bayesian equilibrium (cf. Bach and Perea, 2017).4
Solution concepts are always defined relative to a class of5
games. An existence result ensures that a solution concept always6
generates a tuple of non-empty strategy sets – sometimes also7
called prediction – for any game within the respective class. In8
particular, existence excludes that a solution concept can only9
be applied to some strict subset of the intended class of games.10
For static games with complete information Nash (1950) provides11
an existence result for the solution concept of Nash equilibrium12
based on Kakutani’s generalized fixed point theorem (Kakutani,13
1941, Theorem 1). Also using Kakutani’s generalized fixed point14
theorem the existence of generalized Nash equilibrium within15
the class of static games with incomplete information can be16
established as follows.17
Theorem 1. Let Γ be a game with incomplete information, and18
βUi ∈ ∆(Ui) a probability measure for every player i ∈ I . Then, there19
exists a generalized Nash equilibrium (βi)i∈I ∈ ×i∈I
(
∆(Ci×Ui)
)
such20
that margUiβi = βUi for all i ∈ I .21
Proof. For every player i ∈ I , and for every set Xi ⊆ Ci × Ui22
define a set ∆β
U
i (Xi) := {βi ∈ ∆(Xi) : margUiβi = βUi }, as well as a23
correspondence fi : ×j∈I
(
∆
βUj (Cj × Uj)
)
↠ ∆β
U
i (Ci × Ui) such that24
fi
(
(βj)j∈I
) := ∆βUi ({(ci, ui) ∈ Ci×Ui :∑(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i β−i(c−i, u−i)25 ·ui(ci, c−i)) ≥∑(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i β−i(c−i, u−i) ·ui(c ′i , c−i) for all c ′i ∈26
Ci}. Consider the correspondence f : ×j∈I
(
∆
βUj (Cj × Uj)
)
↠27
×j∈I
(
∆
βUj (Cj × Uj)
)
, where f
(
(βj)j∈I
) := ×j∈I fj((βk)k∈I) for all28
(βj)j∈I ∈ ×j∈I
(
∆
βUj (Cj × Uj)
)
. Observe that the set ×j∈I
(
∆
βUj (Cj ×29
Uj)
)
as well as for all (βi)i∈I the image set f
(
(βi)i∈I
)
are non-30
empty, compact, and convex. Let
(
(βj)nj∈I
)
n∈N be some converging31
sequence with limit (βj)j∈I , where βnj ∈ ∆(Cj × Uj) for all j ∈ I32
and for all n ∈ N. Consider some player i ∈ I and suppose33
that βˆni ∈ fi
(
(βnj )j∈I
)
for all n ∈ N as well as that the sequence34
(βˆni )n∈N is converging with limit βi. It is then the case that βˆi ∈35
fi
(
(βj)j∈I
)
. Consequently, the function f is upper semi-continuous.36
By Kakutani (1941, Theorem 1) it follows that there exists a tuple37
(β∗i )i∈I ∈ ×i∈I∆β
U
i (Ci×Ui) such that (β∗i )i∈I ∈ f
(
(β∗i )i∈I
)
. Therefore,38
(β∗i )i∈I constitutes a generalized Nash equilibrium of Γ such that39
margUiβ
∗
i = βUi for all i ∈ I . ■40
Accordingly, for every incomplete information game and for41
every tuple of probability measures about utility functions, it is42
possible to construct a generalized Nash equilibrium that matches43
these probability measures about utility functions. As an imme-44
diate corollary of Theorem 1 an existence result analogous to45
Nash (1951, Theorem 1) ensues: every finite game with incomplete46
information has a generalized Nash equilibrium.2 However, Theo- 47
rem 1 is stronger, since it requires generalized Nash equilibrium 48
to satisfy additional conditions by fixing the probability measures 49
about utility functions. Intuitively, no matter what beliefs about 50
payoffs agents may hold in a specific context of a complete 51
information game, a corresponding generalized Nash equilibrium 52
always exists. Besides, note that in a sense the formulation of 53
Theorem 1 is similar to how Ely and Pe¸ski (2006) as well as 54
Dekel et al. (2007) define their incomplete information solution 55
concepts of interim rationalizability by fixing the players’ belief 56
hierarchies on utility functions. 57
3. Common belief in rationality 58
From the perspective of a single player there exist two basic 59
sources of uncertainty with respect to Γ . A player faces strategic 60
uncertainty, i.e. what choices his opponents make, as well as 61
payoff uncertainty, i.e. what utility functions represent the op- 62
ponents’ preferences. The notion of an epistemic model provides 63
the framework to describe the players’ reasoning about these two 64
sources of uncertainty. Formally, an epistemic model of Γ is a 65
tupleMΓ = ((Ti)i∈I , (bi)i∈I), where for every player i ∈ I , the set 66
Ti contains all of i’s types and the function bi : Ti → ∆(C−i×T−i× 67
U−i) assigns to every type ti ∈ Ti a probability measure bi[ti] on 68
the set of opponents’ choice type utility function combinations. 69
Given a game and an epistemic model of it, belief hierarchies, 70
marginal beliefs, as well as marginal belief hierarchies can be 71
derived from every type. For instance, every type ti ∈ Ti induces 72
a belief on the opponents’ choice combinations by marginalizing 73
the probability measure bi[ti] on the space C−i. For simplicity 74
sake, no additional notation is introduced for marginal beliefs. It 75
should always be clear from the context which belief bi[ti] refers 76
to. 77
Some further notions are now introduced. For that purpose 78
consider a game Γ , an epistemic model MΓ of it, and fix two 79
players i, j ∈ I such that i ̸= j. A type ti ∈ Ti of i is said 80
to deem possible some choice type utility function combination 81
(c−i, t−i, u−i) ∈ C−i × T−i × U−i of his opponents, if bi[ti](c−i, t−i, 82
u−i) > 0. Analogously, a type ti ∈ Ti deems possible some 83
opponent j’s type tj ∈ Tj, if bi[ti](tj) > 0. For each choice type 84
utility function combination (ci, ti, ui) ∈ Ci × Ti × Ui, the expected 85
utility is given by 86
vi(ci, ti, ui) =
∑
c−i∈C−i
(
bi[ti](c−i) · ui(ci, c−i)
)
87
for every player i ∈ I . Optimality can be viewed as a property of 88
choices given a type utility function pair. Formally, given some 89
utility function ui ∈ Ui and some type ti ∈ Ti of player i, a choice 90
ci ∈ Ci is optimal for (ti, ui), if vi(ci, ti, ui) ≥ vi(c ′i , ti, ui) for all 91
c ′i ∈ Ci. A player believes in his opponents’ rationality, if he only 92
deems possible choice type utility function triples – for each of 93
his opponents – such that the choice is optimal for the type utility 94
function pair, respectively. Formally, a type ti ∈ Ti believes in the 95
opponents’ rationality, if ti only deems possible choice type utility 96
2 If no specific probability measures on utility functions are imposed on
generalized Nash equilibrium as additional conditions, then our solution concept
can also be constructed in a more direct way based on Nash’s existence theorem.
For a given incomplete information game
(
I, (Ci)i∈I , (Ui)i∈I
)
, fix a utility function
u∗i ∈ Ui for every player i ∈ I and consider the complete information game(
I, (Ci)i∈I , ({u∗i })i∈I
)
. By Nash (1951, Theorem 1) a Nash equilibrium (σi)i∈I exists.
Define for every player i ∈ I a probability measure βi ∈ ∆(Ci × Ui) where
βi(ci, ui) :=
{
σi(ci), if ui = u∗i ,
0, otherwise,
for all (ci, ui) ∈ Ci×Ui . It then follows that (βi)i∈I constitutes a generalized Nash
equilibrium.
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function combinations (c−i, t−i, u−i) ∈ C−i × T−i × U−i such that1
cj is optimal for (tj, uj) for every opponent j ∈ I \ {i}.2
Iterating belief in rationality gives rise to the interactive rea-3
soning concept of common belief in rationality.4
Definition 3. Let Γ be a game with incomplete information,MΓ5
an epistemic model of it, and i ∈ I some player.6
– A type ti ∈ Ti expresses 1-fold belief in rationality, if ti7
believes in the opponents’ rationality.8
– A type ti ∈ Ti expresses k-fold belief in rationality for some9
k > 1, if ti only deems possible types tj ∈ Tj for all j ∈ I \ {i}10
such that tj expresses k− 1-fold belief in rationality.11
– A type ti ∈ Ti expresses common belief in rationality, if ti12
expresses k-fold belief in rationality for all k ≥ 1.13
A player satisfying common belief in rationality entertains14
a belief hierarchy in which the rationality of all players is not15
questioned at any level. Observe that if an epistemic model con-16
tains for every player only types that believe in the opponents’17
rationality, then every type also expresses common belief in ra-18
tionality. This fact is useful when constructing epistemic models19
with types expressing common belief in rationality.20
4. Epistemic characterization21
Before the incomplete information solution concept of gener-22
alized Nash equilibrium can be characterized epistemically, some23
further epistemic notions need to be invoked. For this purpose,24
consider a game with incomplete information Γ , some epistemic25
modelMΓ of it, and fix some player i ∈ I .26
A type ti ∈ Ti of player i is said to have projective beliefs, if for27
every opponent j ∈ I \ {i} it is the case that bi[ti](tj) > 0 implies28
that bi[ti](ck, uk) = bj[tj](ck, uk) for all (ck, uk) ∈ Ck×Uk and for all29
k ∈ I \{i, j}. Intuitively, a player with projective beliefs thinks that30
every opponent shares his belief on every other player’s choice31
utility function combination.32
Moreover, a type ti ∈ Ti of player i is said to have inde-33
pendent beliefs, if bi[ti](c−i, u−i, t−i) = Πj∈I\{i}bi[ti](cj, uj, tj) for34
all (c−i, t−i, u−i) ∈ C−i × T−i × U−i. Intuitively, a player with35
independent beliefs excludes the possibility that his opponents’36
choice utility function pairs could be correlated.37
In addition, for every opponent j ∈ I \{i}, a type ti ∈ Ti believes38
that j is correct about i’s belief about the opponents’ choice utility39
function combinations, if bi[t ′i ](c−i, u−i) = bi[ti](c−i, u−i) for all40
t ′i ∈ supp(bj[tj]), for all tj ∈ supp(bi[ti]), and for all (c−i, u−i) ∈41
C−i × U−i.42
Furthermore, a type ti ∈ Ti of player i is said to have connected43
beliefs, if for two opponents j, k ∈ I \ {i} such that j ̸= k, it44
is the case that tk ∈ supp(bj[tj]) or tj ∈ supp(bk[tk]) for all45
tj, tk ∈ supp(bi[ti])46
Besides, for every opponent j ∈ I \ {i}, a type ti ∈ Ti of player47
i is said to believe that j expresses a certain property, if ti only48
deems possible types tj ∈ Tj of player j that express the property.49
Using these epistemic notions, the following epistemic char-50
acterization of generalized Nash equilibrium emerges.51
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a game with incomplete information, i ∈ I52
some player, and u∗i ∈ U some utility function of player i. A choice53
c∗i ∈ Ci is optimal for u∗i in a generalized Nash equilibrium, if and54
only if, there exists an epistemic modelMΓ of Γ with a type ti ∈ Ti55
of player i such that c∗i is optimal for (ti, u
∗
i ) and ti satisfies the56
following conditions:57
(i) ti has projective beliefs,58
(ii) ti believes that every opponent j ∈ I \{i} has projective beliefs,59
(iii) ti has independent beliefs,60
(iv) ti believes that every opponent j ∈ I \ {i} has independent 61
beliefs, 62
(v) ti believes in the opponents’ rationality, 63
(vi) ti believes that every opponent j ∈ I \ {i} believes in the 64
opponents’ rationality, 65
(vii) ti believes that every opponent j ∈ I \ {i} deems possible ti, 66
(viii) ti believes that every opponent j ∈ I \ {i} is correct about i’s 67
belief about the opponents’ choice utility function combina- 68
tions, 69
(ix) ti believes that every opponent j ∈ I \ {i} believes that i 70
is correct about j’s belief about the opponents’ choice utility 71
function combinations. 72
(x) ti has connected beliefs. 73
Proof. For the only if direction of the theorem, let c∗i be optimal 74
for u∗i in a generalized Nash equilibrium (βj)j∈I . Construct an 75
epistemic model MΓ = ((Tj)j∈I , (bj)j∈I) of Γ , where Tj := {tj} 76
and bj[tj](c−j, t−j, u−j) := β−j(c−j, u−j) for all (c−j, u−j) ∈ C−j×U−j 77
and for all j ∈ I . 78
As
vi(c∗i , ti, u
∗
i ) =
∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i) · u∗i (c∗i , c−i)
≥
∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i) · u∗i (ci, c−i)
= vi(ci, ti, u∗i )
for all ci ∈ Ci, it is the case that c∗i is optimal for (ti, u∗i ). 79
Observe that by definition of the marginal beliefs of bk[tk] 80
about the opponents’ choice type utility function combinations 81
to be the product measure Πl∈I\kβl for all k ∈ I , it directly holds 82
that every type has projective and independent beliefs. It thus 83
also directly follows that every type believes every opponent to 84
have projective and independent beliefs. 85
Consider some opponent j ∈ I \{i} of player i and a choice type
utility function tuple (cj, tj, uj) ∈ Cj×{tj}×Uj of player j such that
bi[ti](cj, tj, uj) > 0. Then, βj(cj, uj) > 0 and
vj(cj, tj, uj) =
∑
(c−j,u−j)∈C−j×U−j
β−j(c−j, u−j) · uj(cj, c−j)
≥
∑
(c−j,u−j)∈C−j×U−j
β−j(c−j, u−j) · uj(c ′j , c−j)
= vj(c ′j , tj, uj)
for all c ′j ∈ Cj, by construction of bi[ti] and by virtue of (βj)j∈I being 86
a generalized Nash equilibrium. Thus, cj is optimal for (tj, uj). 87
Therefore, ti believes in the opponents’ rationality. Analogously, 88
it can be shown that every type tj of every player j ∈ I \ {i} 89
also believes in the opponents’ rationality. As bi[ti](tj) = 1 for 90
all j ∈ I \ {i}, it follows that ti believes his opponents to believe 91
in the opponents’ rationality. 92
Note that it directly holds that ti believes every opponent 93
j ∈ I \ {i} to deem possible his true type ti, as there exists only 94
this single type of i in the epistemic modelMΓ . 95
Moreover, ti’s marginal belief on C−i × U−i coincides with 96
Πj∈I\{i}βj. Since bi[ti](tj) = 1 and bj[tj](ti) = 1 holds for every 97
opponent j ∈ I\{i} of player i, type ti believes that every opponent 98
j believes that i’s marginal belief on C−i × U−i is indeed given by 99
Πj∈I\{i}βj. Analogously, it can be shown that the single type tj ∈ Tj 100
for every player j ∈ I \{i} believes that every respective opponent 101
k ∈ I \ {j} is correct about j’s marginal belief on C−j × U−j. As for 102
all j ∈ I \ {i} it is the case that bi[ti](tj) = 1 and tj believes that i 103
is correct about j’s marginal beliefs on C−j × U−j, it follows that 104
ti believes every opponent j to believe that i is correct about j’s 105
marginal belief on C−j × U−j. 106
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Finally, as there exists only one type for each player, every1
type must have connected beliefs.2
For the if direction of the theorem, consider an epistemic3
model MΓ of Γ with a type ti ∈ Ti of player i that satisfies4
conditions (i)− (x) and such that c∗i is optimal for (ti, u∗i ).5
Construct a tuple (βj)j∈I ∈ ∆
(×j∈I (Cj × Uj)) of probability6
measures such that βj(cj, uj) := bi[ti](cj, uj) for all (cj, uj) ∈ Cj×Uj7
and for all j ∈ I \ {i}, and βi(ci, ui) := bm[tˆm](ci, ui) for all8
(ci, ui) ∈ Ci × Ui and for some m ∈ I \ {i} and for some tˆm ∈ Tm9
with bi[ti](tˆm) > 0.10
We first show that for all players j, k ∈ I \ {i}, for every type11
tj ∈ Tj such that bi[ti](tj) > 0 and for every type tk ∈ Tk such12
that bi[ti](tk) > 0, it is the case that bj[tj](ci, ui) = bk[tk](ci, ui)13
for all (ci, ui) ∈ Ci × Ui. Fix some (ci, ui) ∈ Ci × Ui. Suppose that14
j = k and consider tj, t ′j ∈ Tj with bi[ti](tj) > 0 and bi[ti](t ′j ) > 0.15
Towards a contradiction assume that bj[tj](ci, ui) ̸= bj[t ′j ](ci, ui).16
By condition (vii), it is the case that bj[tj](ti) > 0. Hence, tj deems17
it possible that i is not correct about j’s belief about i’s choice18
utility function combination, a contradiction with condition (ix).19
Now, suppose that j ̸= k and consider tj ∈ Tj as well as tk ∈ Tk20
with bi[ti](tj) > 0 and bi[ti](tk) > 0. By condition (x) and without21
loss of generality, it is the case that bj[tj](tk) > 0. By condition22
(ii), it follows that bj[tj](ci, ui) = bk[tk](ci, ui).23
Next, we show that (βj)j∈I constitutes a generalized Nash equi-
librium. Consider player i and suppose that βi(ci, ui) > 0. Then,
bm[tˆm](ci, ui) > 0, and there thus exists a type t ′i ∈ Ti of player
i such that bm[tˆm](ci, t ′i , ui) > 0. By conditions (viii) and (iii), it
follows that bi[t ′i ](c−i, u−i) = bi[ti](c−i, u−i) = β−i(c−i, u−i). By
condition (vi), ci is optimal for (t ′i , ui), and hence ci is optimal for
(ti, ui). Therefore,∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i) · ui(ci, c−i) = vi(ci, ti, ui)
≥ vi(c ′i , ti, ui) =
∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i) · ui(c ′i , c−i)
for all c ′i ∈ Ci.24
Now, consider some player j ∈ I \ {i} and suppose that
βj(cj, uj) > 0 for some (cj, uj) ∈ Cj × Uj. Then, bi[ti](cj, uj) >
0, and consequently bi[ti](cj, tj, uj) > 0 for some type tj ∈ Tj
of player j with bi[ti](tj) > 0. By condition (i), it holds that
bj[tj](ck, uk) = bi[ti](ck, uk) = βk(ck, uk) for all (ck, uk) ∈ Ck × Uk
and for all k ∈ I \ {i, j}. Since βi(ci, ui) = bm[tˆm](ci, ui) for all
(ci, ui) ∈ Ci × Ui, and as bi[ti](tj) > 0, it follows from above that
bj[tj](ci, ui) = bm[tˆm](ci, ui) = βi(ci, ui) for all (ci, ui) ∈ Ci × Ui.
By condition (iv), it thus holds that bj[tj](c−j, u−j) = β−j(c−j, u−j).
Moreover, by condition (v), the choice cj is optimal for (tj, uj), and
thus ∑
(c−j,u−j)∈C−j×U−j
β−j(c−j, u−j) · uj(cj, c−j) = vj(cj, tj, uj)
≥ vj(c ′j , tj, uj) =
∑
(c−j,u−j)∈C−j×U−j
β−j(c−j, u−j) · uj(c ′j , c−j)
holds for all c ′j ∈ Cj. Consequently, (βj)j∈I constitutes a generalized25
Nash equilibrium.26
Since bi[ti](c−i) = β−i(c−i) and c∗i is optimal for (ti, u∗i ), it is
the case that∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i) · u∗i (c∗i , c−i) = vi(c∗i , ti, u∗i )
≥ vi(ci, ti, u∗i ) =
∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i) · u∗i (ci, c−i)
for all ci ∈ Ci. As (βj)j∈I constitutes a generalized Nash equilib-27
rium, c∗i is optimal for u
∗
i in a generalized Nash equilibrium. ■28
Fig. 3. A two player game between Alice and Bob.
The preceding theorem shows that correct beliefs conditions 29
are inherently linked to the incomplete information solution con- 30
cept of generalized Nash equilibrium. In fact, conditions (vii)−(ix) 31
together form the correct beliefs assumption that is needed. Intu- 32
itively, with the presence of incomplete information the correct 33
beliefs assumption naturally does not only apply to strategic but 34
also to payoff uncertainty. 35
However, only two layers of common belief in rationality are 36
needed for the epistemic characterization of generalized Nash 37
equilibrium. In fact, the epistemic conditions of Theorem 2 do not 38
even imply common belief in rationality. 39
Remark 1. There exists a game Γ with incomplete information, 40
an epistemic modelMΓ of Γ , i ∈ I some player, and some type 41
ti ∈ Ti of player i such that ti satisfies conditions (i) − (x) of 42
Theorem 2, but ti does not express common belief in rationality. 43
As complete information is a special case of incomplete infor- 44
mation, the following example of a two person complete infor- 45
mation game establishes Remark 1. 46
Example 1. Consider the two player game between Alice in Bob 47
represented in Fig. 3. Construct an epistemic model MΓ of Γ 48
given by TAlice = {tA, t ′A, t ′′A } and TBob = {tB, t ′B} with bAlice[tA] = 49
(c, tB), bAlice[t ′A] = (c, t ′B), and bAlice[t ′′A ] = (d, tB), as well as 50
bBob[tB] = 0.5 · (a, tA)+ 0.5 · (a, t ′A), and bBob[t ′B] = (a, t ′′A ). Observe 51
that tA satisfies conditions (i) − (x) of Theorem 2. However, tA 52
does not express common belief in rationality, as tA believes that 53
tB deems possible that Alice is of type t ′A, which believes that Bob 54
is of type t ′B, which in turn believes Alice to be of type t
′′
A and to 55
choose a, i.e. which believes Alice to choose irrationally. ♣ 56
Restricting attention to the specific class of complete informa- 57
tion games, the epistemic characterization of generalized Nash 58
equilibrium provides an epistemic characterization of the solu- 59
tion concept’s complete information analogue i.e. Nash equilib- 60
rium. The result is a direct consequence of Theorem 2, if payoff 61
uncertainty is eliminated. 62
Corollary 1. Let Γ be a game with complete information, and i ∈ I 63
some player. A choice ci ∈ Ci is optimal in a Nash equilibrium, if and 64
only if, there exists an epistemic modelMΓ of Γ with a type ti ∈ Ti 65
of player i such that ci is optimal for ti and ti satisfies the conditions 66
(i)− (x) of Theorem 2. 67
With Corollary 1 a new epistemic characterization of Nash 68
equilibrium is added to the analysis of static games with complete 69
information. 70
5. Related literature 71
The solution concept of Nash equilibrium for static games 72
with incomplete information has been explored in terms of its 73
underlying epistemic assumptions notably by Aumann and Bran- 74
denburger (1995), Perea (2007), Barelli (2009), as well as Bach 75
and Tsakas (2014). The relation of our work to this previous 76
literature is now discussed. 77
Most importantly, our epistemic characterization (Theorem 2) 78
differs from the previous epistemic literature on Nash equilib- 79
rium by considering the more general framework of incomplete 80
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information. Also, the formulation of the solution concept of1
generalized Nash equilibrium does explicitly involve payoff un-2
certainty. From a classical game theoretic perspective, Theorem 13
can be viewed as an incomplete information analogue to Nash4
(1951, Theorem 1).5
In contrast to Theorem 2, the epistemic characterizations by6
Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), Perea (2007), Barelli (2009),7
as well as Bach and Tsakas (2014) are all restricted to the special8
case of complete information. However, Corollary 1 provides an9
epistemic characterization of Nash equilibrium for static games10
with complete information and can thus be directly compared to11
the previous literature on Nash equilibrium.12
First of all, for the case of more than two players, Aumann and13
Brandenburger (1995) use a common prior assumption in their14
model, which essentially states that the beliefs of all players are15
derived via Bayesian conditionalization from a single probability16
measure. Barelli’s (2009) action consistency assumption weakens17
the common prior assumption. Accordingly, any belief about the18
expectation of any random variable – measurable with respect19
to the players’ choices – must be equal to the expectation and20
coincide for all players. Bach and Tsakas (2014) further weaken21
Barelli’s global assumption by only requiring action consistency22
between pairs of players on a biconnected graph. In a sense,23
both the common prior assumption as well as action consistency24
postulate that the players’ beliefs are sufficiently aligned. In con-25
trast to the epistemic characterizations of Nash equilibrium by26
Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), Barelli (2009), as well as27
Bach and Tsakas (2014), Example 1 does not use any form of28
common prior or action consistency.29
The epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium by Aumann30
and Brandenburger (1995) imply common belief in rationality31
(cf. Polak, 1999). For Perea (2007) the same holds (this follows32
from some proofs in Perea, 2007). In comparison, Example 133
establishes that the epistemic conditions used by Example 1 do34
actually not imply common belief in rationality.35
Furthermore, the approaches by Aumann and Brandenburger 36
(1995), Barelli (2009), as well as Bach and Tsakas (2014) are state- 37
based, whereas we employ a one-person perspective approach 38
by modelling all epistemic conditions within the mind of the 39
reasoner only. The elementary epistemic operator in Aumann and 40
Brandenburger (1995) as well as in Barelli (2009) is knowledge, 41
while we use the weaker epistemic notion of belief. In contrast to 42
Perea’s (2007) epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, Corol- 43
lary 1 does not imply that a player believes his opponents to be 44
correct about his full belief hierarchy: our conditions only imply 45
that a player believes his opponents to be correct about his first- 46
order belief, i.e. the first layer in his belief hierarchy. Unlike Bach 47
and Tsakas (2014) we do not use any graph structure as additional 48
modelling component. 49
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